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A cloud environment is being built at Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sciences 
Leppävaara campus. Its purpose is to serve the university’s faculty and students, while also 
providing the opportunity for the university to function as a public cloud provider. The initial 
purpose of the thesis was to propose suggestions and find solutions on how to integrate next-
generation firewalls into a datacenter infrastructure, to shield it from threats emanating from 
both the university’s intranet and the public internet. 
 
Due to delays in the implementation of the cloud software environment, the project was carried 
out by performing a case study using two physical next-generation firewalls and devices that 
were available at a network laboratory on campus. These included generic layer 2 and 3 
switches, and three computers. One of these was installed with the same Linux distribution 
which is used in the cloud environment. The four main objectives were as follows: configure 
the firewalls with high availability, integrate user authentication with the Linux host, enable 
secure remote connections, and harden the network. 
 
During initial research, the firewalls were found to be extremely versatile devices, with multiple 
advanced technologies not found in traditional firewalls, such as deep-packet inspection, ap-
plication awareness, and integration to the cloud. The firewalls were configured in an ac-
tive/active highly available state through three physical Ethernet links going between them. 
External user authentication was integrated with an authentication server running on the Linux 
host, and the traffic was secured with a self-generated security certificate. Secure remote con-
nections were enabled by configuring a virtual private network infrastructure on the firewalls. 
Finally, the network was hardened by following security policy best-practice guidelines as laid 
out by the firewall manufacturer. 
 
The firewalls were found to be highly capable devices, well suited for securing a modern vir-
tualized datacenter based on their multiple advanced security features. However, the data 
throughput performance of these firewalls was found to be lacking for the production environ-
ment. The bottleneck they create will have to be mitigated with specialized solutions for certain 
user groups. Due to the limited time allotted to the case study, further study on the full extent 
of the capabilities and technologies of the firewalls is recommended. 
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Metropolia Ammattikorkeakoulun Leppävaaran kampuksen tiloihin on rakenteilla pilvipalve-
luympäristö, jonka on tarkoitus palvella Metropolian opiskelijoita ja henkilökuntaa ja samalla 
mahdollistaa toiminta julkisena pilvipalveluntarjoajana. Tämän opinnäytetyön alkuperäisenä 
tavoitteena oli selvittää, miten useampi seuraavan sukupolven palomuuri tulisi integroida 
palvelinkeskuksen infrastruktuuriin. Näillä palomuureilla on tarkoitus suojata palvelinympä-
ristöä tietoverkkouhkilta niin Metropolian sisäverkosta kuin julkisesta internetistä. 
 
Pilviympäristön viivästymisen vuoksi insinöörityö toteutettiin suorittamalla tutkimus käyttäen 
kahta fyysistä palomuuria ja Leppävaaran kampuksen verkkolaboratorioissa käytettävissä 
olleita laitteita, joihin yhteen asennettiin sama Linux-jakeluversio, jota käytetään palvelinkes-
kuksen virtualisoinnissa. Neljänä päätavoitteena oli konfiguroida palomuurit korkeasti käy-
tettävään tilaan, integroida käyttäjäntunnistus ulkoiseen palvelimeen, mahdollistaa salatut 
etäyhteydet ja koventaa verkko uhkia vastaan. 
 
Insinöörityön tutkimuksessa palomuurit todettiin erittäin kyvykkäiksi laitteiksi, jotka sisältävät 
monia perinteisistä palomuureista puuttuvia kehittyneitä teknologioita, kuten syvällisen pa-
kettien luotauksen. Korkea käytettävyys konfiguroitiin kolmen palomuurien välisen linkin 
avulla. Ulkoinen käyttäjätunnistus toteutettiin yhdistämällä palomuurit Linux-koneelle konfi-
guroituun käyttäjäntunnistuspalvelimeen. Salatut etäyhteydet mahdollistettiin palomuurien 
sisältämillä etäyhteystyökaluilla. Lopuksi verkko kovennettiin noudattamalla valmistajan 
suosittelemia verkon suojaus- ja tietoturvakäytäntöjä. 
 
Palomuurit osoittautuivat monipuolisiksi tietoturvalaitteiksi, jotka useiden kehittyneiden tie-
toturvaominaisuuksiensa ansiosta soveltuvat hyvin modernin virtualisoidun palvelinkeskuk-
sen suojaamiseen. Tutkimuksessa käytetyn palomuurimallin todettiin kuitenkin olevan da-
tankäsittelyn suoritusteholtaan alimitoitettu pilviprojektin tarpeisiin. Palomuurien luoma tie-
donsiirtopullonkaula täytyy ohittaa joidenkin käyttäjäryhmien osalta lopullisessa käyttöym-
päristössä. Rajallisen tutkimusajan vuoksi, aivan kaikkiin palomuurien sisältämiin hyödylli-
siin ominaisuuksiin ei ehditty tutustua. Jatkoa ajatellen on suositeltavaa tutustua näihin kon-
figuroimattomiin ominaisuuksiin, jotta palomuureista saadaan tuotantoympäristössä kaikki 
mahdollinen hyöty. 
Avainsanat palomuuri, asennus, Palo Alto Networks, virtualisoitu palvelin-
keskus, pilvipalvelu, tietoturva 
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1 Introduction 
 
The internet is full of security threats that require appropriate measures and tools to 
counteract. One of the most important of these tools is a network device referred to as a 
firewall. It is a security appliance, the main purpose of which is to secure information 
technology devices and information networks. Firewalls achieve this by inspecting, de-
tecting, and filtering out traffic from the network that is potentially harmful to the network, 
its devices, and its end users. 
 
The main goal of the thesis project was to find appropriate practices and solutions on 
how to integrate firewalls manufactured by Palo Alto Networks, Inc. into a virtualized 
datacenter that is located in the premises of Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied 
Sciences’ Leppävaara campus (henceforth referred to as Metropolia). The aim of this 
virtualized datacenter is to provide cloud application services to the university, and po-
tentially also to (other) external end users. These firewalls are planned to be used to 
shield the datacenter from threats emanating from both the Metropolia intranet and the 
public internet. 
 
The thesis is primarily meant to serve as an introductory guide to implementing the fire-
walls for the administrators of the virtualized datacenter project. It also strives to stay 
understandable for readers that do not have in-depth knowledge of virtualized datacen-
ters and firewalls. However, general knowledge of computers and information networks 
is expected to understand the contents of this thesis. 
 
The thesis begins with a description of the structure of the datacenter and the surround-
ing network, and continues with an overview and inspection into the capabilities of the 
firewalls. After that, the main goals of the project and the plan formulated to achieve them 
are described and defined. What follows is the process of installing, configuring, and 
testing the network devices and the firewalls, setting up basic user authentication and 
remote access, and formulating examples of valid security policies. The thesis concludes 
with an overview of the configuration process, with what was learned, and with recom-
mendations for implementing the firewalls into the virtualized datacenter.  
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2 Background of the Thesis 
 
2.1 Metropolia as a Private Cloud Provider 
 
Metropolia’s Communications and Network Engineering Department has been designing 
and building a private cloud infrastructure at the Leppävaara campus premises since 
2014. The purpose of the cloud environment is to serve the needs of Metropolia’s faculty 
and students for internal and external e-learning purposes, while also allowing the uni-
versity to sell its courses as e-learning services to external parties, such as other univer-
sities and companies. It is also meant to serve as a platform for product development, 
innovation, and bachelor’s thesis projects that are done in association with companies 
around the Helsinki capital region.  
 
The cloud provides access for the end users to Metropolia’s Internet of Things (IoT) and 
cloud laboratory environments. Access to the data generated by the IoT sensors and 
devices is possible from both the private and public parts of the cloud, thus creating an 
advanced holistic network environment that enables the development of innovative prod-
ucts for the faculty, students, and external users. Offering services to external parties 
and users is enabled by a range of public IP addresses that Metropolia has acquired for 
the cloud project. 
 
At the onset of the thesis work (January 2016), the datacenter infrastructure and the 
network surrounding it was complete, and in the process of configuration. However, the 
project as a whole has suffered from delays because of the delayed delivery of the cloud 
software suite. 
 
2.2 Metropolia’s Private Cloud Environment 
 
The datacenter has been built with Cisco Unified Computing System (UCS) blade server 
devices, built by Cisco Systems, Inc., which include high capability storage and unified 
network switches. The virtualization of the datacenter is being built on open source soft-
ware: an OpenStack-based private cloud environment that is built on the SUSE Linux 
Enterprise Server 12 SP1 Linux-distribution. This unified solution is sold by SUSE as 
SUSE OpenStack Cloud [1;2]. It is described by the SUSE project as follows:  
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SUSE OpenStack Cloud 6 is based on OpenStack Liberty and built on SUSE Linux 
Enterprise Server 12 SP1, the leading open source platform for enterprise work-
loads. It also closely integrates with SUSE Enterprise Storage powered by Ceph 
for highly scalable and resilient software defined storage capabilities. [3.] 
 
SUSE OpenStack Cloud is the OpenStack solution of choice for business-critical 
private clouds. [3.] 
 
The OpenStack project’s website defines OpenStack as:  
A cloud operating system that controls large pools of compute, storage, and net-
working resources throughout a datacenter, all managed through a dashboard that 
gives administrators control while empowering their users to provision resources 
through a web interface [4].  
 
The cloud environment has been built with scalability, high availability, and support for 
multiple tenants and thousands of concurrently running virtual environments in mind. 
 
 
Figure 1. A simplified topology of the datacenter. 
 
The firewalls are planned to be positioned in the datacenter topology as shown in figure 
1. A virtual firewall is planned to protect the datacenter from threats emanating from the 
public internet, while two physical firewalls are meant to handle traffic going to and from 
Metropolia’s intranet. 
 
2.3 Threats to a Virtualized Datacenter 
 
While cloud computing and virtualizing a datacenter provides businesses and datacenter 
operators many benefits in the form of reduced and simplified operating costs, reduced 
service deployment times, greater multi-platform availability, and greater service availa-
bility, capacity and elasticity, virtualization also brings with it its own share of security 
threats [5,45-48].  
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In addition to established computer security threats like viruses, worms, trojans, mal-
ware, spyware, bots, botnets and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, the struc-
ture of a cloud introduces additional attack vectors and potential security vulnerabilities 
that a malicious source can target. The conference publication Emerging Security Chal-
lenges in Cloud Computing classifies these threats as follows: 
There are many security threats which emerge inside or outside of cloud pro-
vider’s/consumer’s environment and these can be broadly classified as Insider 
threats, outsider malicious attacks, data loss, issues related to multi-tenancy, loss 
of control, and service disruption [6,217-218]. 
 
However, this thesis only focuses on the threats which a datacenter can be secured from 
by using modern “next-generation” firewalls, which can be used to secure both the phys-
ical and virtual form factors of a datacenter. Next-generation firewalls are defined by the 
information technology research company Gartner as follows: 
Deep-packet inspection firewalls that move beyond port/protocol inspection and 
blocking to add application-level inspection, intrusion prevention, and bringing in-
telligence from outside the firewall [7]. 
 
Palo Alto Networks is regarded in the information technology industry as one of the lead-
ing providers of next-generation information security products, which is why their firewalls 
were chosen by the Metropolia Communications and Network Engineering Department 
to fulfil the security needs of their cloud environment [8]. 
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3 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. and Their Firewalls 
 
3.1 Background of the Company and the Firewalls 
 
Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (PAN) is a network and enterprise security company based in 
Santa Clara, California. It was founded in 2005, and its core products consist of physical 
and virtual next-generation firewalls, and cloud services which extend the functionality of 
these firewalls [9]. 
 
Palo Alto Networks’ firewalls were selected for the virtualized datacenter project by the 
Communications and Network Engineering Department based on their research into the 
current state of the market of network security products. Metropolia will also start offering 
courses on PAN’s firewalls by autumn 2016, so the use of the company’s products in 
this project offered some great insight into the firewalls beforehand. All PAN firewalls 
offer the same set of functionalities, but with differing levels of performance (different 
amounts of physical Ethernet ports, different values for maximum data throughput and 
connections per second, different maximum amounts of concurrent users, and so on.). 
The original plan was to purchase pairs of both physical and virtual firewalls for added 
redundancy and performance, but due to budget cuts by the university, only two physical 
PA-500 and one virtual VM-100 firewalls were ultimately acquired. 
 
 
Figure 2. The PA-500 firewall. Reprinted from Palo Alto Networks, Inc. [10,1]. 
 
Figure 2 shows the front panel of a PA-500 firewall where the eight gigabit Ethernet 
interfaces, separate management interface, console interface, a single Universal Serial 
Bus (USB) port, and the system status Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) are situated. 
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3.2 Firewall Performance 
 
Table 1 shows the most important values affecting the performance of the PA-500 and 
VM-100 firewalls that the Communications and Network Engineering Department will use 
in securing the virtualized datacenter. 
 
 Performance figures of the PA-500 and VM-100 firewalls. Data gathered from       
Palo Alto Networks, Inc. [11]. 
Feature Description 
Firewall model PA-500 VM-100 
Interfaces (10/100/1000) 8 NA 
Max interfaces (logical and physical) 288 100 
Firewall throughput 250 Mbps (with App-ID on) 1 Gbps (with App-ID on) 
Threat prevention throughput 100 Mpbs 600 Mpbs 
IPsec VPN throughput 50 Mpbs 250 Mpbs 
Max sessions 64000 50000 
New sessions per second 7500 8000 
IPsec VPN tunnels/tunnel interfaces 250 25 
SSL VPN users 100 25 
Virtual routers 3 3 
Max number of security zones 20 10 
Max number of security rules 1000 250 
 
As table 1 shows, the PA-500 firewalls have only eight physical Ethernet interfaces each, 
while the virtual VM-100 naturally has none. The total amounts of combined logical and 
physical interfaces also include potential loopback and virtual router links in the firewall 
configurations created by the administrators. In addition, the physical firewalls have a 
management port and a console port through which the local and remote management 
of the firewalls is performed. As the “Interfaces” row shows, the physical links can work 
in either 10, 100, or 1000 megabits/second (Mbps) performance modes, depending on 
the speed of the link on the other end of the Ethernet-connection. The limited amount of 
ports has to be factored in when planning how to integrate the physical firewalls into the 
datacenter network.  
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The physical firewalls also have limited throughput values. The maximum throughput for 
a single Ethernet-link is 1000 Mbps, but as the firewall is meant to inspect and filter 
network traffic, this value will be lower in actual usage. With App-ID turned on, the max-
imum throughput values are 250 Mbps for the PA-500, and 1 Gigabit/second (Gbps) for 
the VM-100. With only App-ID enabled, the firewall is functioning as an Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS) [12,426]. Enabling a threat prevention profile on a link also enables 
the firewall to function as an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), meaning that it can also 
block traffic that is identified as harmful [12,449]. As the “Threat prevention throughput” 
row shows, this will lower the throughput performance of a link even more: into 100 Mbps 
for the PA-500s, and 600 Mbps for the VM-100. 
 
As the PA-500s’ will be shielding the datacenter from threats emanating from Metropo-
lia’s intranet, their throughput capabilities will unfortunately create a performance bottle-
neck for certain user groups. For example, students from degrees focusing on media 
creation will be working with gigabytes of video data on virtual machines running in the 
cloud. To enable sensible performance for them, their needs have to be catered to with 
data links to the cloud that circumvent the firewalls, which will unfortunately create a new 
attack vector that cannot be mitigated with the physical firewalls. Depending on the im-
plementation of these links, they could maybe be secured with the virtual VM-100 fire-
wall, but even its data throughput performance might not be enough for the media crea-
tors’ needs. Solving this problem was, however, out of the scope of this thesis. 
 
The IPsec (IP Security Architecture [13]) performance value defines the maximum 
throughput speed for a single Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel formed with and se-
cured by the IPsec protocol. The maximum amount of VPN tunnels is 250 for the PA-
500s and 25 for the VM-100. The maximum amount of SSL (Secure Sockets Layer [14]) 
VPN users defines the amount of clientless connections secured with either SSL, or the 
newer and more secure TLS (Transport Layer Security [15]) protocol. Depending on how 
the firewalls will be deployed (for example, do other users besides the administrators 
also require secure remote connections into the cloud network), these values might not 
become a limiting performance factor at all. 
 
The maximum number of security rules (1000 on the PA-500, 250 on the VM-100) might 
become a hindrance for the cloud administrators in the future, depending on how many 
user groups with differing security policies the cloud is going to serve, and how granular 
security rules and policies the administrators want to create. However, the rest of the 
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listed performance values of the firewalls seem adequate for the needs of both the ad-
ministrators and users of the cloud.  
 
3.3 Security Features 
 
Besides the usual IP address and protocol based filtering, PAN firewalls are able to cat-
egorize and filter traffic from the network based on individual programs and applications 
by using PAN’s App-ID technology. This enables the firewall administrators to formulate 
more accurate policies for better network security and usability [16]. Traffic in the network 
can also be categorized and filtered based on individual users with the help of the User-
ID technology [17]. PAN’s WildFire technology enables the recognition of known and 
unknown security threats traversing the network. WildFire executes the data it catches 
in a closed virtualized environment situated in PAN’s own cloud network. This way it can 
safely find out if the data is harmful or benign. If the data is found harmful, WildFire 
automatically shields the network against the new threat [18].  
 
Next, the traffic that gets past the App-ID inspection goes through a Content-ID based 
IPS. Content-ID also enables filtering individual file-types from the traffic on an app-by-
app basis. For example, Portable Document Format (PDF) file attachments can be 
blocked from email transmissions while other types of attachments are still allowed. Con-
tent-ID can also be used to create detailed IP address databases. These databases can 
then be paired to individual users and user groups with User-ID. This enables the crea-
tion of differing security policies based on an individual users and groups. In addition to 
these, Content-ID recognizes and filters viruses, worms, malware, spyware, trojans and 
botnet-traffic from traffic permitted by App-ID. [19.] 
 
9 
 
 
Figure 3. Dashboard interface of a PA-500. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Figure 3 shows a screen capture of the main dashboard of the PAN firewall graphical 
user interface (GUI) that is accessed through a web browser. The dashboard offers a 
quick look into the state of the firewall, showing general information such as who is 
logged in, current system resource usage, and live system logs. The administrator can 
customize the dashboard with widgets to show just the information he or she requires. 
 
 
Figure 4. Application Control Center interface of a PA-500. Screenshot [20]. 
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Figure 4 shows the Application Control Center interface of a PAN firewall. It shows in a 
visualized form just what kind of traffic is flowing through the firewall, with charts and 
information about the network activity, threat activity, and blocked activity divided into 
separate information tabs. 
 
3.4 Networking Features 
 
PAN firewalls can be integrated into a network in four ways: a virtual wire based trans-
parent installation, a switch-based installation (OSI layer 2 / L2), a router-based installa-
tion (OSI layer 3 / L3), or as a passively monitoring network tap device. In a virtual wire 
configuration, the firewall only acts as a filter in a network connection, and takes no part 
in the switching and routing of the data that passes through it. All the security features of 
the firewall remain usable. In a layer 2 installation, the firewall takes part in the media 
access control (MAC) address based switching of the network, besides its main function 
as a firewall. In a layer 3 installation the firewall also acts as a router in the network, 
taking part in the routing of information based on IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, and different 
routing protocols. All of these configurations also support traffic filtering based on virtual 
local area network (VLAN) tags. When deployed in tap mode, the firewall can only mon-
itor network traffic and is not able to take any action on it. [12,682-686.] 
 
A virtual wire configuration is clearly the simplest one of the three to implement, because 
it does not require changes to the IP addressing, switching and routing schemes of the 
network. The only IP address required is an address for the management interface (Glob-
alProtect also requires at least one public IP address, but setting up GlobalProtect is not 
mandatory for the firewall to function). Layer 2 and 3 configurations are of course harder 
to implement, since they have to be factored into the switching and routing schemes of 
the network. [12,682-685.] 
 
The virtualized VM series firewalls offer all of the same features as the PA series physical 
firewalls. Installation and integration is possible on VMware, Citrix, Kernel-based Virtual 
Machine (KVM)/OpenStack and Amazon Web Services (AWS) based virtualization en-
vironments among others. [21,1.] 
 
PA and VM series firewalls are also capable of decrypting traffic encrypted by SSL/TLS 
and Secure Shell (SSH) technologies, so that any possible threats transmitted through 
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them can be blocked [12,480]. To be future proof, the firewalls also fully support Internet 
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [12,723]. 
 
For increased usability and security, the firewalls also offer support for multiple different 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions. VPN connections can be configured and en-
crypted with either SSL/TLS or IPsec. Remote access from mobile devices can be ena-
bled with PAN’s GlobalProtect technology and mobile applications, which are available 
on both iOS and Android devices. Two remote networks can be connected through a 
secure “site-to-site” VPN tunnel. GlobalProtect also enables scaling the network to mul-
tiple different VPN connections between multiple remote networks. These connections 
are automatically retrieved by the firewalls from a configured GlobalProtect Portal. 
[12,602;22.] 
 
User identification of local connections and remote VPN connections can be integrated 
with local user databases, smart cards, and/or Remote Authentication Dial-In User Ser-
vice (RADIUS), Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Kerberos, and Windows 
Active Directory (AD) user database servers [12,137]. 
 
3.5 Management Features 
 
Centralized management of PAN devices in a network is possible with a Panorama se-
ries management device. This enables a more user friendlier approach to managing PAN 
devices situated in the same network, because all monitoring, managing and reporting 
can be performed through one unified management portal. These firewalls can also be 
configured to use the same unified policy database, which makes securing the network 
against threats faster and more efficient. [23,1.] 
 
Traffic can be managed and filtered with Quality of Service (QoS) rules, IP addresses, 
users, groups, protocols, applications, and file-types, or with any combination of the pre-
vious attributes [12,227.]. 
 
PAN firewalls also support highly available installations. The only requirements are that 
the firewalls in the cluster are two identical models with identical software and licenses 
installed. In an active/passive configuration one firewall is active, while another is acting 
as a backup device. If the active firewall for some reason fails, the backup firewall auto-
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matically takes its place and starts filtering the network traffic. In an active/active config-
uration two identical firewalls share the same configuration and policies, and process 
traffic concurrently, thus combining their performance. Either of the devices can still take 
full responsibility for the traffic processing, in case one of them fails. In addition, the more 
expensive PAN firewalls have support for redundant power supplies, hard drives, and 
hot-swappable cooling fans. [12,197-199;24.] 
 
PA and VM series firewalls also include extensive information logging and reporting ca-
pabilities that can be used to track all the functions and observations they or their users 
perform during operation. Firewall administrators can customize the logging and report-
ing formats to their needs and liking. For example, the firewalls can be set up to save 
these logs in timed intervals to a logging server, and to simultaneously send a summa-
rized report to the administrator’s email as a one-page PDF file. [12,289.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
4 Plan for the Practical Part of the Final Year Project 
 
Four major goals were identified during the initial stages of planning that needed to be 
assessed in the final year project. They were as follows: 
 
 Integrate and configure the physical and virtual firewalls into the network in a 
highly available state. 
 Integrate the firewall user identification with an external user account database.  
 Set up a secure remote connection to the firewalls. 
 Harden the firewalls according to the needs of a virtualized datacenter. 
 
Due to delays in the private cloud project that were caused by delays in receiving the 
final versions of the cloud environment software, it was concluded that it would not be 
wise to try to integrate the firewalls straight into the datacenter infrastructure as the main 
part of this thesis. The first task was to perform preliminary research into the PAN fire-
walls, and then to propose a plan on how to proceed with the thesis. Initial research, 
suggestions, and plan for the practical part of the final year project is included as Appen-
dix 1 (at the end of the thesis).  
 
After discussing the results of the initial study with the Communications and Network 
Engineering Department, it was concluded that the thesis should concentrate on the two 
physical PA-500 firewalls since the cloud environment would not be finalized during the 
spring of 2016. Both the physical (PA-500) and virtual (VM-100) firewalls’ integration into 
the cloud infrastructure was planned to be handled by the project engineers at a later 
date, with the help of this thesis. 
 
At the end of the discussion, it was decided that a case study should be performed, 
where a simplified network infrastructure is built and the required features are configured 
and tested, based on the findings of the initial research on the firewalls. The case study 
network was built with computers and networking devices that were available at one of 
the networking laboratories at the Leppävaara campus. Specific IP addresses are not 
disclosed in the thesis to protect the security of the Metropolia intranet, and as they are 
not needed to explain the functions and configuration of the case study environment. A 
simplified topology of the case study network can be seen in figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Topology of the case study network. 
The network consisted of two layer 2 Cisco 2960 Series switches, one layer 3 Cisco 3560 
Series switch, two PA-500 firewalls, and three host computers. One of the host comput-
ers was running an installation of SLES 12 SP1, the same Linux-distribution that the 
virtualized datacenter is being built upon, while the two other computers were used for 
configuring the devices in the network. Since the environment was connected to the in-
ternet through Metropolia’s laboratory network, dividing the case study network into sub-
nets and using network-address translation (NAT) was unfortunately not possible, be-
cause it has been explicitly denied by Metropolia’s network administrators for network 
security reasons. All of the traffic into the network and GlobalProtect first passed through 
the virtual wire links in the firewalls for added security. The layer 3 switch acting as the 
network edge was configured by a network laboratory engineer, who also provided a 
reserved /24 sized subnet of IP addresses to be worked with. 
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The three physical links between the firewalls were used for active/active high availability 
(HA). Firewall user authentication was integrated with an OpenLDAP server, an open 
source implementation of the LDAP protocol, running on the SLES host [25;26]. VPN 
access to both firewalls through GlobalProtect was configured with two links sharing a 
floating IP address for added redundancy. Finally, the network was hardened with proper 
security zones, profiles, and policies. Generic and unsafe usernames, group names, and 
passwords were used in the case study environment to save time on configuration. This 
would be a huge security flaw on an actual production system, but since the case study 
network was only a proof-of-concept environment, not conforming to these security best- 
practices was acceptable. All of the configurations were performed through the web in-
terface, unless otherwise noted. 
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5 Building the Case Study Environment 
 
5.1 Network Devices and Topology 
 
The first step in the case study was to build the network shown in figure 6 out of the 
devices that were available at a network laboratory on the Leppävaara campus. 
 
 
Figure 6. The case study network. 
 
As seen again in figure 6, the case study environment was a simple unsubnetted network 
consisting of two PA-500 firewalls, two host machines (plus one host machine on an 
outside network), two layer 2 switches, and one layer 3 switch. All the used IP addresses 
were from a reserved 10.x.x.0/24 subnet, which had 253 usable addresses, .0 being the 
network address and .255 being the network broadcast address. Reserved addresses 
were used for the following links: management interfaces on both of the PA-500 firewalls 
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(.1-.2), the configuration host (.3), a reserved range of addresses for GlobalProtect users 
(.50-.60), management interfaces of the two layer 2 switches (.98-.99), the SLES host 
(.100), the two GlobalProtect interfaces (.251-.252), the GlobalProtect Portal and Exter-
nal Gateway floating IP (.253), and the default gateway on the layer 3 switch (.254). 
 
Specific step-by-step walkthroughs of configuring the network switches and installing the 
SLES host are not relevant to the goals of this thesis. However, the next two paragraphs 
summarize what was done to them. 
 
The layer 3 switch was configured to function as the network gateway, and to reserve 
the /24-range of IP addresses. VLAN 200 was assigned as the network tag, which was 
configured into the layer 2 switches as the default VLAN, with assigned management IP 
addresses (.98-.99). Both layer 2 switches were configured with the .254 default gateway 
address. All of the Ethernet ports in the switches were assigned to VLAN 200. Out of the 
24 available Ethernet ports on each switch, two were in use on the layer 3 switch, three 
on the outside layer 2 switch, and eight on the internal layer 2 switch. Specific connec-
tions to specific ports are not relevant for the functioning of the network. Other configu-
rations on the switches were not needed. 
 
The SLES Linux-distribution was installed on a regular x86-64 computer from a SLES 12 
SP1 installation media provided by the Communications and Network Engineering De-
partment. Default options were used during the installation, with the Domain Name Sys-
tem (DNS) server and Network Time Protocol (NTP) server being set to the default DNS 
and NTP servers of the Metropolia intranet. The IP address reserved for the machine 
was also assigned, along with the default gateway. A 60-day free trial retrieved from the 
SUSE website was used to activate the installation. This allowed the download of official 
updates, patches, and supported programs. Wireshark packet analyzer was installed to 
enable the monitoring of network traffic to and from the SLES-host, and vpnc VPN client 
was installed to enable the testing of a VPN connection from a Linux-host to the Glob-
alProtect infrastructure. Other required software was included by default in the SLES 
distribution. 
 
Out of the eight available Ethernet-interfaces on one PA-500 firewall, six were used in 
the network. Three of them were reserved for active/active HA (ethernet1/6-8), one was 
reserved for both the GlobalProtect Portal and External Gateway (ethernet1/5), and two 
were used for the virtual wire link (ethernet1/1-2). (The two ports that were left unused 
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(ethernet1/3-4) also need to be configured as virtual wire links in the production environ-
ment to support Cisco’s Virtual PortChannel, as seen in figure 3 in Appendix 1, page 4.) 
 
5.2 Basic Setup of the Firewalls 
 
To enable access from the network to the web interface of the firewalls, the management 
interfaces of the firewalls were first configured with their respective IP addresses by con-
necting a host machine with an Ethernet-cable directly to the management port. The 
default IP of the management port on an unconfigured PAN firewall is 192.168.1.1, which 
was accessed from a browser through https://192.168.1.1. Before that, the host-machine 
was configured with an IP from the same subnet. The default superuser account of a 
PAN firewall is admin/admin, which was used to log in. The configuration windows were 
then accessed by clicking the gear-icons situated in the top right corner of the specific 
set of settings that were to be configured. The management IP was changed through the 
Devices > Setup > Management > Management Interface Settings window, as seen in 
figure 7. In addition, all configuration changes made to the firewalls were put into effect 
by “committing” them by pressing the Commit-button situated in the top right corner of 
the web interface. 
 
 
Figure 7. Setting up the management interface. Screenshot [20]. 
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The management IP address, network mask, and default gateway were configured 
through here. To improve security, management access was limited to the IP address 
range of the case study network, and only through the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Se-
cure (HTTPS) and SSH protocols. Ping was also enabled for connectivity testing. 
 
Before HA was configured, basic setup of network services and the physical interfaces 
was required on both of the firewalls. This included setting up the hostnames, the do-
main, the time zone, and the DNS and NTP servers (though NTP was optional). This 
was done from the web interface through the Device > Setup > Management and Ser-
vices tabs, as seen in figures 8 and 9. 
 
 
Figure 8. Configuring the hostname, domain and time zone of the firewall. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The firewalls were named PA-500-1 and PA-500-2 respectively, with the time zone set 
to Europe/Helsinki. The domain was set as “paloalto” without a top-level domain ending 
(such as .com). An incomplete domain name such as this was sufficient for the needs of 
the case study (a proper domain name is recommended to be used in the production 
environment). A login banner could be set to satisfy possible legal requirements in case 
the firewall is accessed by unauthorized users (such as hackers). Latitude and longitude 
could also be set to enable accurate placement of the firewall on the world map. 
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Figure 9. Services settings tab with the settings window open. Screenshot [20]. 
 
As seen in figure 9, setting up the DNS and NTP servers was done from the Services 
tab, along with specifying the update server which the firewall uses to get software, Glob-
alProtect Client, and security service updates from. Secondary DNS and NTP servers 
could be set up also, but this was optional. 
 
 
Figure 10. The Licenses page of the web interface. Screenshot [20]. 
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Licenses for GlobalProtect, Threat Prevention, WildFire, and PAN-DB URL Filtering ser-
vices were registered and activated along with the physical and virtual firewalls through 
a user account on the PAN website at www.paloaltonetworks.com. This was done by an 
engineer of the cloud project environment. He also paired the licenses with the firewalls 
registered to Metropolia’s user account. This enabled the retrieval of licenses from the 
PAN license server through Device > Licenses > “Retrieve license keys from license 
server”, as seen in figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 11. Software update through the web interface. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The firewall software was updated through Device > Software as figure 11 shows. PAN-
OS version 7.0.5-h2 was the newest release as of March 2016. Support for versions 5 
and 6 was still ongoing through security updates. The software has to be downloaded 
and installed by the administrator manually. Both of the PA-500 firewalls had the 7.0.5-
h2 software version installed on them. Updates for the GlobalProtect Client were down-
loaded and activated with a similar procedure through Device > GlobalProtect Client. 
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Figure 12. Setting up dynamic updates. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Dynamic updates for security features (antivirus, applications and threats, GlobalProtect 
data file, and WildFire) were configured through Device > Dynamic Updates. As seen in 
figure 12, these updates could be scheduled to automatically download, install, and sync 
to HA peers in a multitude of timed intervals. As an example, antivirus and WildFire up-
dates were configured to be downloaded and installed one minute past every hour for 
maximum security, while the newest set of known applications and threats was down-
loaded and installed once per day at midnight. PAN themselves recommend to schedule 
a download-and-install of antivirus updates daily, while the same should be performed 
with applications and threats weekly [12,452].  The GlobalProtect Data File contains ven-
dor-specific device information that is used to define and evaluate the host information 
profile (HIP) data sent by connected GlobalProtect Clients, but it was not configured in 
the case study network [12,29]. This HIP data can be used to verify if the remotely con-
nected hosts, for example, have all the updates, security measures, and/or disk encryp-
tion installed and active that are set as required by the firewall administrator [27,16]. 
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Figure 13. Setting up the interfaces. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The physical interfaces of the firewall were configured through Network > Interfaces as 
figure 13 shows. In the case study environment, Ethernet links 1/1-4 were configured as 
virtual wire (though 1/3-4 were not used), ethernet1/5 was configured as a layer 3 link 
with the reserved IP (.251 on PA-500-1, .252 on PA-500-2) and default virtual router, and 
links 1/6-8 were configured as HA. Comments were added to the interfaces to make their 
functions clearer. Security zones were also assigned for the interfaces. PAN firewalls 
have the security zones “trust” and “untrust” by default. These were assigned to the in-
ward and outward pointed virtual wire interfaces respectively. Additional security zones 
were also created for the interface that functioned as the GlobalProtect link, and for the 
tunnel interface that the GlobalProtect Clients connected to. These security zones al-
lowed specifying differing security rules and policies for the GlobalProtect Portal, and for 
the GlobalProtect Clients that connected to the tunnel interface. Zones were created 
through Network > Zones, as seen in figure 14. 
 
24 
 
 
Figure 14. Creating new security zones. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Figure 14 shows the “L3-untrust” zone created for the ethernet1/5 link that was function-
ing as the interface for the GlobalProtect infrastructure. User identification was enabled, 
and it was configured with IP addresses in the Include List. Connections from the 
Metropolia intranet, GlobalProtect Clients, and the GlobalProtect Portal IP address were 
allowed. The “VPN-paloalto” zone was created in a similar manner, but connections to it 
were allowed from any IP address. The creation of tunnel interfaces is specified in chap-
ter 5.5. 
 
Finally, the virtual wire interfaces were paired to virtual wire links from Network > Virtual 
Wires as seen in figure 15. 
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Figure 15. Configuring a Virtual Wire link. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Lastly, a self-generated security certificate was created through Device > Certificate 
Management > Certificates by pressing the “Generate” button at the bottom of the inter-
face. Figure 16 shows a blank Generate Certificate window. A certificate named “Glob-
alProtect-TEST” was created for testing the TLS/SSL encryption of network traffic in the 
case study environment. Cryptographic settings of the certificate were left as default. 
“Common name” was set as the IP address of the firewall, the “Certificate Authority” 
checkbox was marked, and an email attribute was added to the generated certificate. 
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Figure 16. Management interface of the certificates in the firewall. Screenshot [20]. 
 
In the production system, a certificate bought from a trusted certificate authority can be 
added to the firewall by pressing Import at the bottom of the interface. The file format 
needs to be either PEM or PKCS12, and a name has to be given to the certificate, as 
figure 17 demonstrates. Importing the private key from a PEM-file is optional. The pass-
phrase of the certificate file is required for the import to succeed.  
 
 
Figure 17. Importing a certificate. Screenshot [20]. 
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In addition, a list of default trusted certificate authorities is found in its own tab on the 
same interface-page. This information is used by the firewall to verify certificates signed 
by trusted certificate authorities that it comes into contact with. 
 
5.3 Active/Active High Availability  
 
As seen in figure 18, the firewalls had three Ethernet connections going between them. 
These were used for active/active high availability, where they acted as control, data, 
and packet forwarding links (also referred to as HA1, HA2, and HA3 links) [28,12]. The 
connections used the Ethernet interfaces 1/6, 1/7 and 1/8 of both firewalls. The links 
were designated with the HA interface-type as detailed in chapter 5.2. The control link 
could also have been configured to use the dedicated management port of the firewall, 
thus freeing a generic Ethernet-port for other uses. This would have however required 
enabling encryption for security, and ensuring functional routing through the intermediate 
network. Thus, a dedicated port was used for the control link in this example. [12,207.] 
 
 
Figure 18. High availability links that connect the firewalls. 
 
Configuring high availability was done through the tabs located at Device > High Availa-
bility. Firstly, high availability was enabled, the mode was set as active-active, and to 
identify the HA pair the Group ID was set as the same value on both firewalls. Config 
sync was enabled, and the local and peer device IP addresses were configured accord-
ingly. A description for the pair was optional. As the HA links between the firewalls were 
directly connected, addresses from any of the three private IP address spaces could be 
used for the control link. Network 172.16.1.0/24 was used as an example [28,15]. 
28 
 
 
Figure 19. High availability configuration with the Setup window open. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Figure 19 shows the General tab of the high availability configuration interface with the 
Setup window open. Device ID was set to 0 to identify PA-500-1 as the active-primary 
firewall in the active/active HA pair, and the peer IP 172.16.1.101 was defined. On PA-
500-2, the Device ID was correspondingly set to 1. The Device Priority value is used in 
an active/passive HA pair by the firewalls to determine which one of them is elected as 
the active or passive firewall in the HA pair. Heartbeat Backup was marked to enable the 
transfer of heartbeat and hello messages through the management port in case the con-
trol link fails [28,14].  
 
The control link was configured with the assigned port number, IP, and network mask 
addresses on both firewalls. Encryption could be enabled on the control link, but it re-
quired the export and import of an HA Key between the firewalls through Device > Cer-
tificate Management > Certificates. As the control link was directly connected and used 
private IP addressing, it was not reachable from other networks. Encryption was also 
optional, which is why it was not implemented in this example. The data link was config-
ured with the required port number and with session synchronization enabled. The data 
link uses layer 2 transportation by default and the link was directly connected, so IP 
addressing was not needed in this case [28,15]. Other configurations on the control and 
data links were kept as default or were not required. Backups for both links could be 
configured, but this was limited in the case study environment by the amount of physical 
ports on the PA-500 firewalls. 
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As seen in figure 19, the third link required by active/active HA configuration was config-
ured from the Active/Active Config tab. The HA interface was set as ethernet1/8 on both 
firewalls. VR (Virtual Router) and QoS Syncs were also enabled, and the other two op-
tions were kept as default. By committing the configuration, active/active HA was enabled 
between the firewalls. Different firewall performance parameters for automatic failover 
could be configured from the Link and Path Monitoring tab, but these were not used in 
the case study. The functionality of HA was verified from the Dashboard interface tab 
with the HA widget. 
 
VR Sync had to be enabled for the floating IP configuration to work between the Glob-
alProtect links, and for virtual router configurations to sync between both firewalls, which 
is where the Virtual Address section of the tab came in. 
 
 
Figure 20. Configuring a floating IP. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Configuration of the floating IP was identical on both firewalls. The interface was set to 
ethernet1/5 (as it was used on both firewalls for GlobalProtect), the address was set as 
.253 with a network mask of /32, device priorities were set as shown (lower value signi-
fying higher priority), and Failover address if link state is down was checked, as shown 
in figure 20. This enabled the failover of the GlobalProtect infrastructure and connections, 
in case they for some reason failed on the primary PA-500-1 firewall. 
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5.4 SLES OpenLDAP User Authentication 
 
SLES 12 SP1 had all the software and components installed by default that were re-
quired for setting up an external user authentication server. The configurations were 
done through the Yast2 (Yet another Setup Tool version 2) graphical user interface, and 
the used modules were Authentication Server, CA Management, Common Server Cer-
tificate, and User and Group Management. The Authentication Client was started to en-
able automatic filling in of information fields regarding the LDAP user database, once it 
was created. 
 
Firstly, to enable securing the LDAP user directory traffic between the SLES host and 
the firewalls, the “GlobalProtect TEST” certificate was exported as a PKCS12 file from 
one of the firewalls. This was done through the Device > Certificate Management > Cer-
tificates interface. A passphrase was used to secure the created file. A USB flash drive 
was then used to transfer the file to the SLES host.  This certificate was then imported 
into the machine with the Common Server Certificate module through the “Import/Re-
place” action, where the module asked for the certificate file and the corresponding pass-
phrase. The default view of the Common Server Certificate module after a successful 
certificate import on SLES is shown in figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21. The Common Server Certificate module. Screenshot [29]. 
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Next up was the configuration of the LDAP server with the Authentication Server module. 
On initial startup the module initiated a configuration wizard that was used to set up the 
server and a user database. The wizard first asked if the server should be started, and 
should ports be opened in the firewall. The software based firewall of SLES was disabled 
in this environment so opening the ports was not needed. Next up the server type was 
set as “Stand-alone server”, and “Enable Kerberos Authentication” was set to “No”. 
 
What followed was the configuration of the new database. The Database Type was set 
as hdb, the Base DN was “dc=ldap,dc=paloalto”, Administrator DN was “cn=admin”, the 
LDAP Administrator Password was set as something simple (for easier testing), and the 
Database Directory was set as the default path “/var/lib/ldap”. This is shown in figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22. Creating the new database. Screenshot [29]. 
 
Enabling TLS encryption of the database traffic was done from the Authentication Server 
module through Global Settings > TLS Settings. “Enable TLS” was checked, and the 
already imported “GlobalProtect TEST” certificate was imported to the LDAP server from 
“/etc/ssl/servercerts/”, as shown in figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Enabling TLS encryption on the OpenLDAP server. Screenshot [29]. 
 
LDAP over SSL (ldaps) was left disabled, because all versions of SSL are considered 
unsecure, and have been surpassed by the newest 1.2 version of TLS [30]. Changes to 
the LDAP server configuration were enabled by pressing OK in the lower right corner of 
the window. 
 
Users and groups for LDAP were created with the User and Group Management module. 
LDAP users were accessed through the “Set Filter” option, which required the input of 
the BindDN parameters (“cn=admin,dc=ldap,dc=paloalto” in this case) and LDAP server 
password. The BindDN field was automatically filled by the active Authentication Client 
service. View of the LDAP users is shown in figure 23. 
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Figure 24. A view of the LDAP users. Screenshot [29]. 
 
Users and groups could be added, edited, and deleted through the Users and Groups 
tabs. The user “test-admin” and group “test-admins” were created. A view of the New 
LDAP User window is shown in figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25. Creating a new LDAP user. Screenshot [29]. 
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The next step was to configure the LDAP server profile on the firewalls through Device 
> Server Profiles > LDAP. The LDAP Server Profile window is shown in figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 26. Configuration of a LDAP server profile. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Verify Server Certificate for SSL sessions was not enabled because the connection is 
using the self-generated “GlobalProtect TEST” certificate. SSL/TLS was marked as re-
quired, but the connection was limited to only TLS by using the port 389 for the LDAP 
connection [12,142]. Timeouts and retry intervals were left as default.  
 
An Authentication Profile was created and an Administrator account was added to enable 
logging into the firewall with the created “test-admin” credentials. An Authentication Pro-
file was created through Device > Authentication Profile, and the parameters that were 
used are shown in figure 27. 
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Figure 27. Creating an Authentication Profile. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The login attribute used was the username parameter (cn value) of the user account that 
was to be added. The domain was specified as “ldap.paloalto” as it was created on the 
LDAP server. The username modifier was set to “%USERINPUT%”, so users would not 
have to specify the domain they would be using to log in. Specifying which users and/or 
groups can login from the domain could be done with the Allow List in the Advanced tab. 
All users from the “ldap.paloalto” domain were permitted in this environment. Finally, the 
“test-admin” user was added to the list of Administrators on the firewall. This was done 
through the Device > Administrators interface, as shown in figure 28. 
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Figure 28. Adding the LDAP user to the firewall. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The name of the user was set as identical to the one in the LDAP server (“test-admin” in 
this case), authentication profile was set as the previously created SLES-LDAP, and a 
custom administrator role was used to limit the administrator privileges of the “test-ad-
min” user. The custom role was created through Device > Admin Roles, as shown in 
figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29. Creating a custom admin role. Screenshot [20]. 
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The admin roles are deeply customizable. The “test-admin” role shown in figure 28 was 
limited to only access the Dashboard and ACC tabs of the web interface. Extensible 
Markup Language application programming interface (XML API) and command line in-
terface (CLI) access rights could also be customized through their own tabs.  
 
The functionality and security of the LDAP integration was verified with Wireshark by 
inspecting the traffic going between the SLES host and the firewalls. The information 
transaction was put in motion by logging into the web interface with the “test-admin” 
credentials. An example of this transaction is shown in figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30. Web traffic of a LDAP user authentication handshake. Screenshot [29]. 
 
The session was initiated with a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packet, as the 
firewall used the Start TLS operation to secure the traffic [31]. 
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Figure 31. The PAN web interface as seen by the “test-admin” user. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Figure 31 shows the web interface as it was seen by the “test-admin” user. The user/ad-
ministrator permissions and role of “test-admin” could be customized afterwards by al-
tering the configuration of the “test-admin” administrator profile. 
 
5.5 Setting up the GlobalProtect Infrastructure 
 
The first step in creating the GlobalProtect infrastructure was to create the tunnel that 
the GlobalProtect Clients connected to. This was done through the Network > Interfaces 
> Tunnel tab. Figure 32 shows the parameters of the “tunnel.1” tunnel interface that was 
created. “GlobalProtect” was given as the comment, the tunnel was assigned to the de-
fault virtual router of the firewall, and it was placed in the “VPN-paloalto” security zone 
that was previously created. Netflow was left blank, as the technology was not used in 
the study. No other configuration on the tunnel was needed. 
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Figure 32. Creating a tunnel interface. Screenshot [20]. 
 
An SSL/TLS service profile was created to specify that the connections created with 
GlobalProtect were secured with the latest TLSv1.2 protocol. This was done through 
Device > Certificate Management > SSL/TLS Service Profile. The configuration window 
is shown in figure 33. 
 
 
Figure 33. Creating a SSL/TLS Service Profile. Screenshot [20]. 
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The Name was configured as “GlobalProtect”, the certificate was specified as the previ-
ously generated “GlobalProtect TEST”, and the minimum version of the protocol used 
was set as TLSv1.2 with the max version set to “Max”. 
 
The next step was the creation of a GlobalProtect Gateway, through which the remote 
clients connected to the internal network. It was done through Network > GlobalProtect 
> Gateways. The general settings of the remote access VPN gateway (titled “RA-VPN-
GW”) are shown in figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34. General settings of the external gateway. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The gateway was assigned to interface ethernet1/5, the IP was specified as the floating 
IP that was previously created, SSL/TLS Service Profile was set to “GlobalProtect”, and 
the user authentication was set to use the previously configured “SLES-LDAP” authenti-
cation profile, so that the “test-admin” user credentials could be used to remotely connect 
to the network. 
 
The client configuration was done through its own tab in the same GlobalProtect Gate-
way configuration window. The tunnel settings are shown in figure 35. 
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Figure 35. Client configuration tunnel settings. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The remote clients were set to connect to the “tunnel.1” interface. Maximum number of 
concurrent clients was 100 by default. IPsec was enabled and the default crypto was 
used. X-Auth support was enabled to allow remote connections from other VPN clients 
besides the official GlobalProtect client software. This required setting a group name 
(“GP-Linux” in this case) and a password. Skip Auth on IKE Rekey was left as enabled. 
An IP pool for the remote clients was configured from the Network Settings tab, as shown 
in figure 36. 
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Figure 36. Specifying an IP pool for the remote users. Screenshot [20]. 
 
A configuration named “VPN” was created, which specified the IP pool for the remote 
users. The User/User Group tab could be used to specify what users and/or groups are 
allowed to connect, but here it was left unconfigured. The IP pool and the access route 
that are added to the remote clients’ routing table were specified in the Network Settings 
tab as seen in figure 36. Also, the DNS server was configured through the Network Ser-
vices tab. Timeout settings were left as default. 
 
The final component that was configured was the GlobalProtect Portal, which was done 
through Network > GlobalProtect > Portals. It also used the ethernet1/5 interface with 
the floating IP address. SSL/TLS Service Profile was set to “GlobalProtect”, and the au-
thentication profile was “SLES-LDAP”, as with the GlobalProtect Gateway. The client 
certificate and certificate profile parameters were left unconfigured for simplified testing. 
The parameters used are shown in figure 37. 
 
43 
 
 
Figure 37. GlobalProtect Portal configuration. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The “RA-VPN-GW” gateway and the “GlobalProtect TEST” certificate were paired with 
the Portal through the Agent Configuration tab. The certificate was added as a trusted 
root CA, and a configuration was created for the gateway. The configuration was also 
given the name “RA-VPN-GW”, and the parameters used for it are shown in figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 38. Client configuration for the GlobalProtect Portal. Screenshot [20]. 
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The remote client connection method was set as “on-demand”, and the other options 
were left as default. The created “RA-VPN-GW” gateway was added as an external gate-
way to the configuration in the Gateways tab. Settings in other tabs were left as default. 
 
To enable successful network access for the remote users once they were connected to 
the firewall, a static default route to the default gateway needed to be added to the virtual 
router on the firewall. This was done through the Network > Virtual Routers interface. 
Interfaces “ethernet1/5” and “tunnel.1” were already assigned to the default router. A 
static route to the default gateway address named “Default GW” was added from the 
Static Routes tab. This is demonstrated in figure 39. 
 
 
Figure 39. Configuring a static default route. Screenshot [20]. 
 
The connectivity to the GlobalProtect infrastructure was tested with the external Windows 
configuration host, and the internal SLES host. A secure HTTPS connection to the portal 
address .253 was established with a web browser from the Windows machine. This pre-
sented the GlobalProtect Portal login screen, where the “test-admin” credentials were 
used to log in. The appropriate GlobalProtect Client was then downloaded, installed and 
executed. The “test-admin” credentials and the IP address of the GlobalProtect Portal 
were then used to establish the secure remote connection. A secure IPsec tunnel was 
created, and the client had connection to the internal network. These steps are demon-
strated in figure 40. 
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Figure 40. Downloading and using the GlobalProtect client on a Windows host. Screenshot [32]. 
 
As the GlobalProtect Portal web interface shows, the GlobalProtect client does not have 
a version for Linux based operating systems, which is why a third party Linux VPN client 
needed to be used. The vpnc client was used to demonstrate connectivity. It was down-
loaded through the Software Management module on the SLES host. Successful con-
nectivity is demonstrated in figure 41. 
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Figure 41. Connecting to GlobalProtect from the SLES host with vpnc. Screenshot [29]. 
 
On the Windows host the remote connection was disconnected from the GlobalProtect 
client application, while on the SLES host it was done by executing the command “vpnc-
disconnect” in the terminal. 
 
5.6 Formulating Security Policies 
 
This chapter demonstrates how the best-practice security policies to protect the network 
from most layer 4 and layer 7 attacks and threats, as recommended by PAN, were con-
figured [12,463-465]. The difference between security policies and profiles is that the 
security profiles were applied to the traffic once they had already passed the security 
policy rules of the firewall.  
 
The firewall comes preconfigured with default security profiles for antivirus, anti-spyware, 
vulnerability protection, Uniform Resource Locator (URL) filtering, and WildFire analysis, 
and these were used to fulfil the security best-practice recommendations. Additionally, 
custom security profiles for file blocking, data filtering, and DDoS protection can be cre-
ated. All of the default security profiles were applied to every security policy on the fire-
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wall in the case study. The inspection of multicast traffic was enabled through the Net-
work > Virtual Routers > default > Multicast tab. The default view of the Policies > Secu-
rity interface is shown in figure 42. 
 
 
Figure 42. Default view of all the security policies in the firewall. Screenshot [20]. 
 
Network traffic between the “VPN-paloalto” and “L3-untrust” zones was enabled with two 
separate rules for each direction. Without it, the remotely connected users would not 
have had network access. Access to the GlobalProtect infrastructure was allowed only 
with, and by, the appropriate applications and protocols, such as IPsec, SSL/TLS, and 
the vpnc client. Unknown traffic (meaning traffic generated with or by unknown applica-
tions) was blocked with a rule that denied unknown TCP, User Datagram Protocol (UDP), 
and peer to peer (P2P) traffic from traversing to and from the network. A custom file 
blocking profile was also added to the rule “trust to untrust”, as recommended by PAN. 
This profile “blocks Portable Executable (PE) file types for internet-based SMB (Server 
Message Block) traffic from traversing the trust to untrust zones, (ms-ds-smb applica-
tions).” [12,463]. The parameters of this file blocking profile are shown in figure 43. 
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Figure 43. Parameters of the “Block PE-files” file blocking profile. Screenshot [20]. 
 
A default zone protection profile was also created to secure the zones against packet-
based attacks, such as flooding. This was done through Network > Network Profiles > 
Zone Protection. The configured “Default Zone Protection Profile” is shown in figure 44. 
 
 
Figure 44. “Default Zone Protection Profile” parameters. Screenshot [20]. 
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Protection against TCP SYN, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), ICMPv6, UDP, 
and other IP packet based flooding was enabled. TCP/UDP port scans and host sweep 
were blocked through the Reconnaissance Protection tab. Additionally, dropping mal-
formed packets and packets with spoofed IP addresses was enabled through the Packet 
Based Attack Protection tab as an example. The tab also contains a multitude of other 
possible parameters for enabling IP, TCP, ICMP, IPv6, and ICMPv6 packet drops, but 
these were left as default. Finally, the created zone protection profile was applied to each 
zone from the Network > Zones interface. 
 
As an example of the usage of the security profiles, the work of the URL filtering profile 
is demonstrated in figure 45.  
 
 
Figure 45. The URL filtering policy in action during web browsing. Screenshot [32]. 
 
Additional CLI commands that enhance firewall security are detailed in the PAN-OS® 
Administrator’s Guide [12,464-465]. These can be used to protect the network against 
multiple different kinds of potential packet based attacks and vulnerabilities. 
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6 Overview of the Finalized Case Study Network 
 
6.1 Results 
 
Thanks to the relatively simple structure of the planned case study network, building and 
configuring the devices north and south of the firewalls took only a couple of days, and 
allowed most of the effort to be concentrated on studying and configuring the firewalls. 
Simplifying the environment from the design that is meant be used in the production 
environment (as shown in Appendix 1, page 4, figure 3) was the right decision to make. 
The topology of the case study network is shown again in figure 46. 
 
 
Figure 46. Topology of the case study network. 
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The initial setup of the firewall devices was straightforward and easy to perform. Config-
uring the usernames, management IPs, interfaces, zones, and connected network ser-
vices, and generating the test certificate did not present any difficulties.  
 
Configuring the active/active HA was relatively straightforward, and quick to implement. 
During the four or so weeks it was running on the firewalls, it performed its operations 
flawlessly. Afterwards, most of the configurations performed on the firewalls needed to 
be only done on the primary firewall (PA-500-1), as they were then automatically syn-
chronized to the secondary firewall (PA-500-2) by the HA process. The failover function-
ality also worked as expected, including the floating IP that was configured for GlobalPro-
tect. These were tested by disconnecting some Ethernet links, disconnecting the power 
cable, and by shutting down the primary firewall on separate occasions. The primary-
device designation also automatically transferred back to the primary firewall when it was 
brought back on and/or online. 
 
Enabling secure external user authentication presented the toughest problem to solve in 
the environment. Configuring the OpenLDAP server on the SLES host, and then con-
necting that to the firewalls as an external user database took only a few days, but getting 
this network traffic secured was a headache. The problem partly lied in both the unclear 
process of importing a self-generated security certificate and the unhelpful error coding 
and information sources related to the functionality of the OpenLDAP server on the SLES 
host. The OpenLDAP implementation on the SLES host was not a particularly user-
friendly experience. The hurdles related to the self-generated certificate are most likely 
eliminated in the production environment with the use of a security certificate purchased 
from a trusted root certificate authority. The end result was however, despite the prob-
lems encountered, a reliable and secure user authentication connection between the 
SLES host, the firewalls, and the remotely connected GlobalProtect clients. 
 
Configuring the GlobalProtect infrastructure was, despite initial impressions, mostly 
straightforward and relatively painless. Again, only the self-generated security certificate 
was a cause for concern, as it was (naturally) not recognized by the remote clients as a 
trusted certificate. However, it proved that the network traffic with the remote clients can 
be, and is, encrypted. The failover of the floating IP address of the GlobalProtect links 
also worked flawlessly when tested by disconnecting the physical cable from the ether-
net1/5 interface of the primary firewall. Integration with the external user authentication 
also performed as expected. However, the fact that the official GlobalProtect Client is 
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only available for Windows and Mac operating systems means that an unofficial third 
party VPN client must be used on Linux devices. The client used in the study to demon-
strate the remote Linux connectivity (vpnc), however simple to use, is not the most up to 
date and secure third party client available, as it was lastly updated in 2008 [33]. As such, 
the use of another Linux VPN client in the production environment is highly advisable, 
such as strongSwan, which is still being actively developed and updated [34]. 
 
The configuration of the security policies was decided to comply with the best-practice 
security policies that are laid out in the PAN-OS® Administrator’s Guide [12,463-465], 
as they provide great examples and a good starting point for creating more specific and 
granular security policies and rules to be used in the production environment. Trying to 
simulate the network traffic that is going to be traversing in the production environment 
would not have been feasible in the timeframe and with the resources allotted to the case 
study. Once the firewalls are integrated and inspecting the network traffic in the actual 
production network, more appropriate security rules can be formulated as the firewalls 
inspect and categorize the traffic going through them. Otherwise, the security policing 
capabilities of the firewalls were found to be really powerful and customizable. 
 
Overall, the finalized case study environment and the firewalls worked as envisioned. All 
of the four major goals of the project were achieved, and their configuration processes 
were documented. Some speed bumps and problems were encountered along the way, 
but ultimately they were overcome.  
 
6.2 Insights and Recommendations 
 
Due to the focused scope of the case study, it had some limitations in regards to explor-
ing the capabilities of the firewalls more broadly. Many highly useful features were thus 
left untested. These included configuring a master key and managing multiple adminis-
trators with differing levels of access privileges. The capabilities of classifying traffic with 
User-ID were also left unexplored. Specifying security policies and rules based on server 
functions, such as allowing only DNS related traffic to and from a DNS server, were not 
configured. Decryption of inbound and outbound traffic is also a capability that was not 
implemented. In addition, customizing the QoS rules and managing the logging capabil-
ities are also great features that were left untouched. 
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An important thing to note is the possible cross-dependency of some of the firewall con-
figurations, such as security certificates and the GlobalProtect infrastructure. Performing 
and committing changes to one configured feature might not be possible, if that feature 
is referenced by another feature’s configuration. This is only a small hindrance, but 
something that is good to keep in mind. 
 
Exploring and implementing the unconfigured and untested features that were men-
tioned is highly advisable in the production environment. In addition, the throughput per-
formance of the firewalls will most likely create a bottleneck in the production system. 
This unfortunately cannot be mitigated with configurations on the firewalls, especially if 
they are configured to perform as an IPS. The bottleneck has to be mitigated through 
other means, be it with other network devices or network connections. However, all of 
the tested features performed adequately and fulfil the needs of the production environ-
ment. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The goals of the project were to find solutions for integrating Palo Alto Networks’ next-
generation firewalls into Metropolia’s virtualized datacenter, enabling external user au-
thentication on them, configuring secure remote access, and formulating examples of 
appropriate security policies. All of these goals were ultimately achieved in a case study 
environment. 
 
If the project were to be carried out again, it would be recommended to study and imple-
ment some of the aforementioned features that were left unconfigured, such as network 
traffic decryption. Configuring the high availability control link to use the management 
port instead of a dedicated Ethernet interface is also something that should be explored, 
if that port is needed to enable some other feature. Procurement of a Panorama central 
management appliance would also be advisable for a larger set of PAN’s physical and/or 
virtual firewalls.  
 
The PA-500 model firewall was found to be an extremely multifaceted and powerful se-
curity device. However, this particular model’s throughput performance was found to be 
lacking for Metropolia’s virtualized datacenter’s needs. Still, its various security, network-
ing and management features and tools are robust and effective for securing a modern 
virtualized network environment, and should fulfill the security feature needs of any net-
work and network administrator. 
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Disclaimer:  
This appendix was originally written to serve as an introductory document for the instructors on 
how to proceed with the final year project concerning the Palo Alto Networks firewalls, which is 
why it was written using present and future tenses. This is also the reason why it is not as self-
explanatory as the main part of the thesis, and why it addresses the instructors directly. It is 
included here largely in the same form as it was submitted to the instructors before the practical 
part of the final year project was started. 
Potential Solutions on How to Integrate the Palo Alto Networks’ Physical 
and Virtual Firewalls into a Virtualized Datacenter 
The purpose of this document is to propose solutions on how to complete the four main 
objectives of my engineer’s thesis, and it is addressed to the project engineers of the 
cloud environment project. The four main objectives are: how to integrate the firewalls 
with high availability, how to integrate the firewall user authentication with an LDAP 
server, how to enable the remote management of the firewalls with VPN tunnels, and 
how to harden the firewalls. Based on the results of the thesis, the ultimate goal is then 
to integrate two Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (PAN) PA-500 series physical, and one VM-100 
series virtual firewall into a virtualized datacenter. 
The datacenter is being built on the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES) 12 SP1 op-
erating platform, with virtualization being enabled by OpenStack Cloud technology. The 
physical firewalls would be sandwiched between two Cisco Nexus 2000 –series fabric 
extenders with Virtual PortChannel enabled, and two Cisco 3500 –series routers. I will 
concentrate on finding appropriate solutions from information sources provided by Palo 
Alto Networks, the SUSE project, the OpenStack project, their relevant user communi-
ties, and other related independent information sources (such as user forums, videos, 
how-tos, deployment examples and so on). 
1 How to Integrate the Palo Alto Networks Firewalls into the Datacenter 
Topology with High Availability 
PAN’s firewalls provide three different deployment options for integrating them into a 
network topology. If needed, they can be installed with layer 2 or layer 3 switching/routing 
enabled, but the deployment method that PAN recommends is what they call virtual wire, 
where the firewall simply works as a “bump on the wire”, inspecting all the traffic that 
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passes through it. In essence, virtual wire is a bridged deployment, where the firewall 
works as a customs officer, inspecting and controlling what traffic gets through and what 
gets filtered. According to the PAN-OS® Administrator’s Guide it “simplifies installation 
and configuration”, and “does not require any configuration changes to surrounding or 
adjacent network devices.”  Virtual wire also provides the possibility for enforcing differ-
ent policies in different networks (based on VLANs and/or IP classifiers) with subinter-
faces. Virtual PortChannel is also supported. [12,682.] 
 
Figure 1. Virtual Wire deployment. Reprinted from PAN-OS® Administrator’s Guide (2016) 
[12,682]. 
Based on these facts, I would recommend the virtual wire deployment for our use case. 
An overview of a virtual wire deployment is shown in figure 1. 
Regarding basic firewall capabilities, the PA-500 and VM-100 are equal and offer all of 
the same technologies. The only differences are in throughput values, amount of con-
current sessions, the amount of policies and so on. The throughput capabilities of (at 
least) the PA-500, as seen in table 1, would most likely create a bottleneck towards the 
Metropolia intranet. 
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 Performance figures of the PA-500 and VM-100 firewalls. Data gathered from Palo 
Alto Networks, Inc. [11]. 
Feature Description 
Firewall PA-500 VM-100 
Firewall throughput 250 Mbps (with App-ID) 1 Gbps (with App-ID) 
Threat prevention throughput 100 Mpbs 600 Mpbs 
IPSec VPN throughput 50 Mpbs 250 Mpbs 
Max sessions 64000 50000 
New sessions per second 7500 8000 
IPSec VPN tunnels/tunnel interfaces 250 25 
SSL VPN users 100 25 
Virtual routers 3 3 
Security zones 20 10 
Max number of policies 1000 250 
1.1 Integrating the Physical Firewalls 
The document Designing Networks with Palo Alto Networks Firewalls contains design 
examples for both a potential case study network and the production network. Since the 
devices (routers and/or switches) I would be using in a case study network would not 
support Virtual PortChannel, I would use the example scenario: “Virtual Wire with Ac-
tive/Active HA”, while the actual production network would be based on the example 
scenario “Virtual Wire with A/A HA and Link Aggregation on Adjacent Switches”. [35.] 
Our two PA-500 series firewalls have eight physical ports each, three of which would be 
used for enabling active/active high availability. They would act as control, data and 
packet forwarding links. This leaves five links to work with for regular data traffic, and 
enabling basic link redundancy. 
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Figure 2. Virtual Wire with Active/Active HA. Reprinted from Designing Networks With Palo Alto 
Networks Firewalls (2012) [35,24].  
 
Figure 3. Virtual Wire with A/A HA and Link Aggregation on Adjacent Switches. Reprinted from 
Designing Networks With Palo Alto Networks Firewalls (2012) [35,34]. 
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The document provides clear guides on how to configure both of these design examples, 
with both GUI and CLI based configurations. In-depth explanation of the firewall ac-
tive/active HA functionality can be found in the document Configuring Active/Active HA 
– Tech Note [28]. 
1.2 Integrating the Virtual Firewall 
The Palo Alto Virtual firewall deployment guide on OpenStack Cloud document provides 
thorough step-by-step instructions on how to integrate a VM series firewall into an Open-
Stack Cloud environment [36]. It enables the orchestration of the firewall from within the 
CloudStack UI and API. In this configuration example the Virtual Router in the firewall 
needs to be enabled, but to only handle upstream routing from the firewall to the next 
hop (meaning the router that handles traffic towards the internet). PAN also provides a 
guide on their website on how to install their VM series firewall into a KVM environment 
[37,191].  
 VM series hardware and software installation requirements. Data gathered from 
VM-Series Deployment Guide (2016) [37,192]. 
Requirements Description 
Hardware Resources  vCPU: 2, 4, 8 
 Memory: 4 GB; 5 GB for the VM-1000-HV 
 Disk: 40GB 
 Disk types supported: Virtio and SCSI for best 
performance; IDE 
 Disk-controllers: virtio, virt-scsi, IDE 
 Intel-VT or the AMD-V chipset that support 
hardware assisted virtualization 
Software Versions  Ubuntu: 12.04 LTS 
 CentOS/ RedHat Enterprise Linux: 6.5 
 Open vSwitch: 1.9.3 with bridge compatibility 
mode 
 
As table 2 shows, SLES 12.1 SP1 is not listed as an officially supported platform, so I 
assume that the only way to test the VM-100 is to install it following the instructions and 
see if it works. PAN also lists three options for attaching the VM-series firewall on the 
network. These will most likely make more sense to you, since you know the cloud envi-
ronment better than me. Different options for attaching the VM series firewall are shown 
in figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Options for attaching the VM series firewall. Reprinted from VM-Series Deployment 
Guide (2016) [37,193]. 
These options are explained in the VM-Series Deployment Guide as such: 
 With a Linux bridge or OVS, data traffic uses the software bridge to connect 
guests on the same host. For external connectivity, data traffic uses the phys-
ical interface to which the bridge is attached [37,193]. 
 With PCI passthrough, data traffic is passed directly between the guest and 
the physical interface to which it is attached. When the interface is attached to 
a guest, it is not available to the host or to other guests on the host [37,193]. 
 With SR-IOV, data traffic is passed directly between the guest and the virtual 
function to which it is attached [37,193]. 
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Figure 5. Secure traffic on a single host. Reprinted from VM-Series Deployment Guide (2016) 
[37,196]. 
Figure 5 shows a graphical presentation of how traffic is secured on a single host. Since 
we only have one VM-100 license, high availability needs to be provided by the KVM 
platform it is installed on. I found an administration guide on SUSE Linux Enterprise High 
Availability Extension 12 SP1 [38]. This high availability extension includes both graph-
ical tools (several YaST modules and the Hawk web interface), and CLI interfaces. The 
guide is comprehensive, so implementing the VM-100 in KVM with high availability ena-
bled should not be too daunting of a task. 
2 Integrating the User Authentication into SUSE OpenStack’s LDAP-
server 
The firewalls include support for multiple different user authentication methods (local, 
LDAP, RADIUS, AD, Kerberos). The SLES 12 SP1 platform includes support for LDAP, 
so that would be our natural choice. SUSE documentation has a simple guide on how to 
configure an LDAP server with YaST [39,32-41]. 
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The Designing Networks with Palo Alto Networks Firewalls document gives a basic over-
view of the operation of using an external user authentication service for the firewalls 
[33,107-109]. I also found some guides on how to use LDAP to authenticate users to the 
Web UI [40]. 
3 Enabling Remote Management with VPN-tunnels and a Virtual Machine 
in Google Cloud 
The solution we had in mind was a Linux-based virtual machine running on the Google 
Cloud, which would have two-factor authentication (Google Authenticator) for logging in, 
and a VPN-tunnel into the management access of the PAN firewalls. The process of 
setting up basic management access to the firewall is detailed in the PAN-OS® Admin-
istrator’s Guide [12,16-21]. Essentially, the VM running on the Google Cloud needs to 
have secure VPN access to the management network of the data center, so the user of 
the VM can access the firewalls’ management interface through a web browser.  
The VPN services require setting up a GlobalProtect infrastructure, which is detailed in 
the GlobalProtect Administrator’s Guide [27]. Since we do not have a Panorama device 
and/or license, the firewalls cannot be managed through one unified portal. They need 
to be accessed individually, which makes me believe that using an IPsec client to get 
VPN access into the management network is the most feasible way to allow that. The 
Linux virtual machine (VM) would need a third-party IPsec client, since PAN only pro-
vides their proprietary IPsec client for Mac and Windows. StrongSwan is one program 
we could use, and PAN also provides a guide for setting it up on Ubuntu [27,36-42]. The 
document that covers GlobalProtect is 166 pages long and very detailed, which makes 
it seem like that setting up the VPN access for remote management is going to be the 
most complicated task to accomplish from our four objectives. 
4 How to Harden the Network 
The minimum architectural requirements for an OpenStack environment are at least one 
controller, network, and compute node each [41]. I believe simulating this in my case 
study (so in essence building a proper minimal OpenStack environment) would be out of 
the scope of my bachelor’s thesis, so we have to find an adequate compromise for sim-
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ulating the production network traffic. I believe a single Linux machine with virtual ma-
chines running on top of KVM would be enough for my needs in this case. It would run 
on one end of the network, with the internet on the opposite end, and the physical fire-
walls being in the middle. I believe this would be the most sensible way for me to study 
what kind of traffic shaping and filtering policies would be needed in the production en-
vironment. 
5 Conclusion 
As I see it, we have two options on how to proceed. I can either build the case study 
network in a lab environment, where I could study and test solutions to all our four main 
objectives as covered above. The results of this study would then be detailed in my the-
sis, which would be at your disposal when integrating the firewalls into the production 
network.  
Or since the cloud environment is not in production yet, we could integrate them into the 
topology straight from the beginning. Virtual wire and zero filtering (at the start) would 
make the firewalls transparent in the network, meaning that the solutions we need could 
possibly be worked on in the actual usage environment. If the topology and software of 
the production environment is still in flux however, trying to integrate the firewalls right 
from the beginning would most likely be ill-advised. Integrating them straight away could 
also complicate my work on the thesis, if for example for some reason I would need to 
access the machines physically after the initial installation into the server room. This 
could turn out to be a harmful time sink, since I only have about two months of time to 
complete my thesis. 
The VM-100 series firewall however could most likely be installed and worked on in the 
production cloud right from the beginning. I see no reason why we could not do that. I 
could also set up the VM acting as an access point for the remote management on the 
Google Cloud. Getting it to work with the production environment afterwards would then 
most likely only require tweaking the parameters of the VPN tunnel configuration. 
I hope this document has (at least mostly) answered questions on how we (and I) can 
get started on working with the actual firewalls themselves. 
